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Resilient nations.*

SUSTAINING PEACE THROUGH ELECTIONS

Perception Survey Results

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Section 1: Survey Respondents

PROFILE SUMMARY

A total of 92 individuals responded to the online survey for Sustaining Peace through Elections that was distributed through a variety of professional networks. Respondents information was self-identified.

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Among the respondents 37% were female and 63% male, while 70% had more than 10 years professional experience.

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Respondents drew from areas of work that encompassed election management (28%), international assistance (22%), election observers (14%), conflict management (13%), political analysts (8%) as well as researchers, human rights professionals and legal analysts.

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
The survey participants that work in an international capacity were 64% while national based respondents accounted for 36%.

Section 2: Context

Question 1. Key Approach


Anticipating a highly contested election with a risk of violent conflict, respondents were asked to rank stability, human rights and rule of law in the order that they would focus the attention of stakeholders to mitigate potential conflict. Rankings were integrated into a single value for each and were roughly equal, although led by Human Rights. **At 38% Human Rights was ranked as the most**

important approach to emphasise to stakeholders to mitigate conflict, while Rule of Law and Stability were ranked almost equally at 32% and 30%, respectively.




Question 2. Electoral Violence

The perception of electoral violence as a growing concern over the past 5 years was posed, asking respondents to agree or disagree or identify no change. **A majority of 55% of respondents saw electoral violence as a growing concern (strongly agree and agree), while 25% saw no change and 20% did not see it as a growing concern in the period.**



Question 3. Causes of Electoral Violence


Contextual Causes of Electoral Violence



The question allowed respondents to select up to three choices from commonly identified contextual causes of electoral violence. **The aggregated responses identified a “winner-take-all” political culture, social divisions and political exclusion as the top three causes of electoral violence.**

Question 4. Elections as a Resolution to Social Divisions


The question asked respondents to agree or disagree to the statement: *“Elections do not resolve deep-seated social divisions but give legitimacy to elected officials to do so.”* **The majority of 88% agreed with the statement that elections do not resolve deep-seated social divisions but give legitimacy to elected officials to do so.**



Question 5. Likelihood of Violence at different levels of elections


The question asked respondents to identify in their opinion what level of elections are, most to least likely, to suffer from electoral violence. Responses were aggregated to form a single value for each level.

The likelihood of violence based on the tier of an election highlighted presidential elections as the most likely followed by legislative elections. Local elections however slightly exceeded State/Provincial level elections.



Section 3: Election Delay


Question 6: Should an Election be Delayed due to Electoral Violence?



Question 6 proposed that in the face of a credible threat of widespread election violence arising, should an election be delayed, even if there is no legal option to do so. A majority of 57% of respondents opted for no delay of an election in the face of possible widespread violence.

Question 6A (OPTION): If Delayed, for how long?

Among the respondents who supported a delay they were asked for how long a postponement should be: up to 3, 6 or 12 months or until a conducive peaceful environment could be established. **Of those that supported a delay in elections due to the threat of wide spread electoral violence, most (50%) supported a delay until conditions were conducive.**




Section 4: Institutional Factors

Question 7 & 8. Institutional Responsibility and Influence


Question 7 asked respondents to rank national institutions based on their responsibility to ensure peaceful elections, while Question 8 asked respondents to rank which institutions had most influence. The international community and media were excluded from the responsibility (question 7) but included in the influence (question 8). The results were joined to show any discrepancy between responsibility and influence.

Political parties as an institutional entity held the greatest combined value for responsibility and influence to ensure a peaceful election; while the election authority and Government were both rated as the most responsible, they had less influence than political parties.




Question 9. EMB Topology

The type of election authority (independent, governmental or one with partisan representatives) was raised to enquire which institutional arrangement was best to foster peaceful elections. **An independent EMB was considered best to foster peaceful elections by 83% of respondents.**



Question 10. Most Important Attribute of an EMB

Respondents were asked to identify the most important attribute of an election authority to prevent electoral violence. **From the choices available, to prevent electoral violence an EMB that has trust among political competitors was viewed as most relevant by 60% of respondents, while trust of the electorate was at 33% and technical competence seen as least important at 7%.**




Section 5: Conflict Periods and Risks


Questions 11 and 12. Pre-Electoral and Electoral Activities.

Respondents were asked to rate specific activities in terms of their likelihood or unlikelihood of being associated with electoral violence. Select activities from the pre-electoral period were identified (question 11) as was the electoral period (polling and results). Individual scores were weighted for each activity to fall within zones of Highly Likely, Likely, Unlikely and Highly Unlikely.

The results spread across highly likely to unlikely, with the campaign period considered most likely to be associated with electoral violence in the pre-electoral period, while the recruitment of voter registration staff was the least likely among the activities.



The results for the electoral period of polling and results only spread across bands of highly likely and likely, arguably reflecting the intensity of the period. **The announcement of results was scored as most likely to be associated with violence followed by the preliminary results. Polling, counting and tabulation clustered along with dispute resolution on the upper margins of likely. While the final activity of swearing-in of officials was rated as the least likely among the activities to be associated with violence.**




Question 13- 16. Contextual Events

Respondents were asked to rank events arising between elections that had been identified through research as contextual causes for violence in subsequent elections. Respondents ranked these events on a scale of Highly Likely, Likely, Undecided, Likely and Highly Unlikely. The results were weighted to form a single score for each event.

Question 13. Political Events

The arrest/detention of opposition leaders scored highly likely and disputed election laws scored second highest, while the only event to be considered unlikely to escalate violence was a sudden decrease in the capacity of the opposition party.


Political Events



Question 14. Development Events


Respondents were asked to rank development-related events between elections in terms of their impact on electoral violence for a future election. **The majority of development-related events were rated as likely, with a drop in economic conditions rated highest.**

Developmental Events




Question 15. Security Events

Respondents were asked to rank security-related events between elections in terms of their impact on electoral violence for a future election. **Internal armed conflict emerged as the highest ranked risk in the Highly Likely category, while all other events were rated as likely.**




Question 16. Electoral Events

Respondents were asked to rank election-related events between elections in terms of their impact on electoral violence for a future election. **All electoral events ranked in the “Likely” band, with an uncertain election schedule being rated as the highest risk.**




Question 17. Electronic Voting and Conflict

Respondents were asked: “In your view, what best completes the following sentence: ‘The use of new technologies like electronic voting machines ... ?’”. Respondents could answer via three options of reducing (by limiting human interference), increasing (by limiting transparency) or not affecting conflict. **45% of respondents saw electronic voting as increasing conflict by limiting transparency.**




Question 18. Social Media

Respondents were asked: “In your view, what best completes the following sentence: ‘The use of social media in elections represents ...?’”. Two options were provided: a new challenge for regulating inflammatory speech and incitement to violence; or, an important development for freedom of expression without censorship. **Most respondents (73%) highlighted social media as a regulatory challenge.**



Section 6: Electoral Violence


Question 19. Electoral Violence: Spontaneous or Planned



Respondents were asked: “In your opinion, is election-related violence most likely to be used as part of a planned strategy or to be spontaneous?”. **65% of respondents considered election-related violence to be part of a planned strategy rather than spontaneous.**


Question 20. Most Common Types of Electoral Violence

Respondents were asked to select up to 5 responses to identify what they considered to be the most common forms of electoral violence that had been identified through research. **The type three most common types of electoral violence were identified as Intimidation, Physical Attacks and Violent Protests.**




Question 21. Most Common Perpetrators

Respondents were able to select two options from a list of possible perpetrators of electoral violence. **The top three perpetrators identified were political party supporters, security forces and youth.**




Question 22. Most Negatively Impacted by Electoral Violence

Respondents were asked to identify the groups most negatively impacted by electoral violence and given an option to select up to two choices. **Voters, women and minority groups were perceived as those most impacted by electoral violence.**




Question 23. Women as Participants

Respondents provided their views as to whether women’s participation as voters is more, less or equally affected as men by the effects of electoral violence. **At 76% most respondents considered women’s participation as voters to be more affected than men by electoral violence.**



Question 24. Female Candidates


Respondents were asked: “Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘Female candidates are commonly targeted by election violence because of their gender.’?”. **At 67% most respondents agreed or strongly agreed that female candidates are targeted by electoral violence due to their gender.**



Section 7: Prevention


Question 25. Strategic Approach to Prevention

Based on focus group discussion outcomes and other research, respondents were asked to select one of three options as the most important strategic approach to preventing electoral violence. **52% of respondents identified political consensus among leaders to reject violence as the most important, while approaches of social values and institutional strengthening were roughly even at 23% and 25%, respectively.**




Question 26. When to Initiate Conflict Monitoring and Analysis

Respondents were provided with a modified electoral cycle that identifies a period of democracy strengthening arising two months after an election and extending to 18 months prior to the next election, as per the diagram opposite. Respondents were asked when is the best time to initiate conflict monitoring and analysis for an election: shortly ahead of the pre-election period, the election period or during the democracy strengthening period, between elections.




Most respondents (47%) identified the democracy strengthening period as the best time in which to initiate conflict monitoring and analysis for an election, while 42% identified at the start of the pre-election period and the remaining 11% shortly before the election period.




Question 27. Priority of Support to Institutions

Respondents were asked to rank the priority of support to institutions based on their importance to peaceful elections. The top priority institutions to support for peaceful elections were identified as the election authority (27%), political parties (18%), civil society organisations (14%) and security forces (12%).




Question 28. Priority Activities to Support Peaceful Elections

Respondents were asked to rank a list of select activities based on their importance to support peaceful elections. **Among the activities listed, respondents prioritised Inter-party Dialogue (20%), Conflict analysis and monitoring (18%) and, civic and voter education (15%).**




Question 29. Mediation Actors for Political Parties

Respondents were asked to identify the best type of actor to convene and conduct mediation activities between political parties. **47% of respondents identified national actors as best positioned to conduct mediation with political parties.**




Question 30. Mediation Actor Attributes

Respondents were provided with four attributes and were asked to rank them as most relevant for a mediation actor to conduct successful mediations. **The most important attribute identified was “no conflict of interest” (35%) followed by the ability to “enforce outcomes” (27%). A “successful track record” of mediation and name recognition were nearly evenly split at 20% and 18% respectively.**




Question 31. Election Observation and Violence

Respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "*Election observation deters acts of election violence during polling, but can transfer the threat to less visible parts of the process*"? **A majority of 56% agreed with an additional 9% strongly agreeing that election observation deters election violence but can also transfer the threat to less visible parts of the process.**




Question 32. Observer Statements and Violence



Respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "*Statements from election observer groups should be self-censored to avoid inflaming tensions that could trigger violence*"? **A majority of respondents (55%) either agreed or strongly agreed that observer statements should be self-censored to avoid inflaming tensions that could trigger violence.**

Question 33. Scenario Question

Respondents were provided a scenario: Four months ahead of a Presidential election the non-acceptance of results emerges as a high risk due to opposition parties alleging abuse of State resources by the ruling party, despite campaign finance laws and a code of conduct that prohibit the use of State resources. (The allegations have arisen a month before entering into the three-month campaign period.) Respondents were provided with a select list of activities and asked to rank them by importance in mitigating the risk of results not being accepted. **The top activities identified by respondents were for inter-party leadership dialogue (29%), support campaign finance monitoring (18%), to engage preventive diplomacy (14%) and support election dispute resolution (14%). Mediation and strengthened election observation were also closely clustered at 13% and 12%, respectively.**



END REPORT